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FEDERAL COURTS - DIVERSITY JuRISDIcTIoN - EFFECT OF STATE LAV
An administrator brought a wrongful death action in a federal
court in Illinois, where the jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship, death having occurred in Utah. The district court dis-
missed the action, ruling that the federal court was bound by an
Illinois statute which provided that no action could be brought in
that state for death occurring outside Illinois if service of process
could be had in the state in which death occurred, and distinguish-
ing the Illinois statute from the Wisconsin statute held violative
of the full faith and credit clause in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951), on the grounds that the Illinois statute permitted the action
if service could not be had in the state where death occurred while
the Wisconsin statute precluded all foreign wrongful death actions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines, 190 F 2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951). On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Permitting an action
if service of process cannot be had on the defendant in the state
where the injury resulting in death occurred does not free the
statute of its contravention of the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution and the holding of the Hughes case,
supra, must be applied. First National Bank of Chicago v. United
Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396 (1952).
In the principal case the Court based its decision squarely on
Hughes v. Fetter, supra. A state may refuse to entertain a cause
of action created by the law of another state only if the cause of
action is contrary to the public policy of the refusing state. This
does not prevent the state from applying the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in individual cases. But apparently this doctrine
may be invoked only by the court on the particular merits of the
individual case and may not be invoked by the legislature to apply
to a class of cases regardless of the particluar merits. There must
be, rather, some reason to invoke the doctrine in the instant case
other than the fact that it falls within a certain class of actions.
In deciding the principal case, the Court refused to meet
squarely the issue of whether the federal courts would be bound
by this Illinois statute, if it were constitutional, on the grounds that
since the statute is unconstitutional, it was not necessary. In a
vigorous concurring opinion, however, Mr. Justice Jackson stated
that federal courts are not bound by the law of the state in which
they are sitting on questions of subject matter jurisdiction. There
have been no Supreme Court decisions on this precise point, but
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the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), has been ex-
tended so far that the Court of Appeals seems justified in deciding
that federal courts are so bound. First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines, 190 F. 2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951), Trust Co. of Chi-
cago v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 183 F. 2d 640 (7th Cir. 1950),
Munch v. United Air Lines, 184 F. 2d 630 (7th Cir. 1950). All of
these cases relied on Wood v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949), in which the Supreme Court stated that a federal court is
just another court of the state in which it sits and is bound by the
laws of that state on questions of the use of the courts. In these,
as well as the Hughes case, supra, and the principal case, the court
is troubled by discrimination against citizen plaintiffs within a state
if different rules prevail in state and federal courts in diversity
cases. Non-citizen plaintiffs would be permitted an action in the
state while citizens, denied access to the federal courts because of
lack of diversity of citizenship, would have no action. The philoso-
phy emanating from the Erie case seems to be bent to prevent this
type of discrimination in all cases. Since the Erie case decided that
there is no federal common law and that the federal courts under
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652, must follow the law of
the state where applicable, there have been numerous decisions
declaring specific subjects to be covered by the act. The Court has
held that federal courts in diversity cases are bound by state law
on questions of burden of proof, Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208 (1939), Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943), ac-
crual of the cause of action, West v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223 (1940), conflicts of laws, Klaxon v. Stentor Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941), statutes of limitations, Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and limitations on who may use the
courts, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), Wood v. Inter-
state Realty Co., supra. The Court of Appeals has interpreted this
to mean that the federal courts must derive their subject matter
jurisdiction in diversity cases from the state in which they are
sitting regardless of where the cause of action arose. Trust Co. of
Chicago v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., supra. However, in only two
of the above cases, the Palmer case, supra, and the Klaxon case,
supra, and the Erie case itself, did the cause of action arise outside
the state in which the federal court was sitting.
Mr. Justice Jackson points out that the trend of these decisions
seems to be that a federal court must go through the onerous task
of sifting the law of the state in which the cause of action arose
through the sieve of the state in which it is sitting, while Congress
has provided for the jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity
cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a), so that a petitioner enters the federal
court by the grace of the law of the United States and not by the
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grace of the laws of Illinois, or any other state. First National Bank
of Chicago v. United Air Lines, supra, at 399. The Court seems to
be reading the Rules of Decision Act, supra, as if it read "the laws
of the state in which the court is sitting" rather than "the laws of
the several states." The Court took no such circuitous route in the
Erie case. There, although the court was sitting in New York, it
went directly to the law of Pennsylvania without using New York
eyes. In its anxiety over the possible evil of discrimination in hav-
ing two separate and distinct systems of justice within a state, the
Court has gotten itself tangled at the brink of a position that a
federal court must derive its subject matter jurisdiction from the
state in which it is sitting. It would seem that the cause of action is
created by the state wherein it arose and that the federal court
should look to the state to find a cause of action upon which to
base subject matter jurisdiction.
A possible solution might be found by regarding the federal
court as having subject matter jurisdiction, but the question of
proper venue being decided by the law of the state in which the
court is sitting. Then the court could say to the plaintiff, "Although
you have a cause of action of which a federal court has jurisdiction,
under state law, you have brought your action in the wrong venue
-in the wrong federal court." Then the court could transfer the
case to the proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a), upon applica-
tion. This would remove some of the uncertainty and ambiguity and
at the same time would allay the discrimination that the Court is
seeking to prevent. If the entire problem is regarded as one of
forum non conveniens with the legislature powerless to lay down
a blanket policy but with federal courts bound by the forum non
conveniens policy of the state, the problem seems to resolve itself
to one upon which agreement and understanding can be reached.
Alba Whiteside
FEDERAL COURTS - JURISDICTION FOR MULTISTATE CORPORATIONS
Plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, brought an action for in-
juries sustained in Vermont against the defendant corporation in
the federal district court for Massachusetts, alleging the corpora-
tion to be organized under the laws of New York. Defendant de-
nied diversity jurisdiction, claiming to be a corporation organized
under the laws of Massachusetts. The district court found that the
defendant was incorporated as a domestic corporation both in New
York and Massachusetts and sustained the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction in conformity with precedents in its circuit.
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On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, Held, affirmed. A corporation incorporated as a domestic
corporation in two or more states must be regarded in each state
of its incorporation as solely domesticated therein for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Seavey v. Boston & Maine R. R., 197 F.2d 485
(1st Cir. 1952).
The principal case is in direct conflict with Gavin v. Hudson &
Manhattan R. R., 185 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1950), and produces an
inter-circuit divergence in an already confused field. The juris-
dictional problem mainly arises when railroads are parties because
of their early corporate founding either by special act or by merger
and consolidation, resulting in a non-descriptive legal entity hav-
ing several states as a domicile. See Comment, 46 YALE L. J. 1370
(1937).
In early history, a suit by or against a corporation was re-
garded as if it was a suit by or against the shareholders as partners
in determining diversity jurisdiction. Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U.S. 1809). In 1844, the Supreme Court
started to retreat from this view in Louisville, C. & C. R. R. v.
Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S 1844). After much dissension within the
court, it was finally decided that all the shareholders should be
conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state of incorporation
for jurisdictional purposes. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,
16 How. 314 (U. S. 1854); see also 1 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE
487 (1938). This legal fiction of corporate citizenship has been
attacked by many writers and has resulted in various attempts,
from 1880 to 1937, to abolish, legislatively, diversity jurisdiction
for corporations. See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56
HARV. L. RIv 853, 1258 (1943).
Most corporations doing business in more than one state are
incorporated in one state and licensed to do business in the others;
therefore, for purposes of jurisdiction, the corporation is consid-
ered a citizen only of the state of incorporation. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 (1881). Whether a corporation is do-
mesticated or merely licensed involves a problem of construing the
corporate charter and the pertinent statutory and constitutional
provisions. Martin's Admr. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 151 U. S. 673
(1893); see 119 A.L.R. 676. The courts, in determining jurisdic-
tion, do not seem affected by chronological order in incorporating,
Memphis R. R. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581 (1882); by where the
action arose, Southern R. R. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326 (1903); Lake
Shore R. R. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (6th Cir. 1909); or by the method
of multiple incorporation. Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R.,
supra.
A corporation which is compelled to incorporate by a state is
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not considered a citizen of that state for jurisdictional purposes.
St. Louis R. R. v. James, 161 U. S. 545 (1896); Southern R. R. v.
Allison, supra. At times, it is difficult to tell exactly when the court
will or will not find compulsion. Compare Southern R. R. v. Allison,
supra, with Memphis R. R. v. Alabama, supra. The basic problem
arises when a corporation is voluntarily domesticated in more than
one state.
A non-resident of the forum can sue such a multistate corpora-
tion in a federal court in any state in which it is incorporated.
Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 44 (1876). A non-resident can also sue
the corporation in a state court in any of the states of incorporation
and the corporation can not remove to a federal curt. Patch v.
Wabash R. R., 202 U.S. 277 (1907).
When such a hybrid corporation sues in a federal court in any
of its incorporating states, it is for diversity purposes considered
a resident of the state in which the action is brought. If it is in-
corporated in both Virginia and North Carolina, the corporation
can not sue a resident of North Carolina in federal court there by
alleging itself to be a citizen of Virginia. Town of Bethel v. Atlantic
Coast R. R., 81 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 682
(1936). But see Nashua R. R. v. Boston R. R., 136 U. S. 356 (1890).
Still another difficult and unanswered problem would be posed
by a suit between the corporation and a citizen of one of its in-
corporating states brought in a neutral forum where the corpora-
tion was merely licensed to do business.
In the Gavin case, supra, and the principal case, the corporation
was being sued by a resident in federal court alleging that the
corporation was a non-resident. In the Gavin case, supra, the court
allowed a New Jersey resident to sue a New York and New Jersey
corporation in the federal court for New Jersey. Judge Goodrich,
finding no Supreme Court case in point, felt it senseless to pile fic-
tion upon fiction and force the plaintiff to leave his home state to
sue one of these multistate corporations in federal court. See RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 207 (1934). The reasoning of this
case would seem to allow the corporation or the opposing party to
change the domicile of the corporation at will in the allegations.
This approach would cause only more problems of jurisdiction and
upset what little order there is to be found in the decisions.
The principal case, after discussing the Gavin case, supra, at
length, decided to follow the prior cases in the first circuit. Peter-
borough R. R. v. Boston R. R., 239 Fed. 97 (1st Cir. 1917); Geoffroy
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 16 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1927); also
Missouri Pac. R. R., v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895). The
court felt that for jurisdictional purposes a multi-state corporation
must be regarded in each state of its incorporation as solely do-
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mesticated therein. Many cases tend to support this view. Chicago
R. R. v. Whitton's Admr., 13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871); Muller v. Dows,
supra; Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast R. R., supra.
As stated in the Seavey opinion we are "required to deal with
unrealistic fictions inexplicable to the layman, although the basic
fiction upon which the concept of corporate citizenship rests im-
presses us as at least practical" As long as corporations are al-
lowed to sue under diversity jurisdiction, there must be some
guide by which jurisdiction can be determined by the courts and
lawyers. It would, therefore, seem practical to follow the ortho-
dox rule that a multistate corporation is to be considered solely
domesticated in each state of incorporation.
Much of the conflict in this area stems from the fact that many
of the Supreme Court decisions were decided in an era when the
concept of the corporate entity and its law was new and unsettled.
It is, therefore, not surprising that these multistate corporations
were considered separate and distinct corporations in each state.
Ohio & Miss. R. R. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286 (U. S. 1861); Chicago
R. R. v. Whitton's Admr., supra. For practical business purposes,
it is unrealistic to consider such a corporation anything but a single
entity. Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R., supra.
If there be any reason for diversity jurisdiction, it would seem
to be to protect the non-resident from local prejudice in state
courts. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, supra; but see,
Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 IHIiv.
L. REv. 483 (1928). If prejudice is the basic premise, then it might
not be so illogical to force the plaintiff to leave his home state if
he wishes to sue a multistate corporation in federal court. Today,
however, it is questionable if there is much merit in the prejudice
theory, especially when a corporation is involved.
Since there are no major policy considerations behind these
cases, it is difficult to say which approach should be taken. It would
help if the Supreme Court would shed a little light upon a field
in which the last case was decided in 1912. Missouri Pac. R. R. v.
Castle, 224 U. S. 541. The approach of the principal case is better
because it follows not only the orthodox rule, but also the practice
of the federal courts to restrict the scope of their jurisdiction. A
further answer would be to treat a multistate corporation as a
party of individuals of various domiciles in every action so that
it could not resort to a federal court in any of its incorporating
states under the doctrine of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267
(U. S. 1806). See Comment, 44 IIAky. L. REv. 1106 (1931). What-
ever the answer, it should be settled; until then, the lawyer in this
field will have little but confusion as a guide.
Charles F. Johnston
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LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW - PARKING MIETERS-
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY FOR THEYR USE.
Under a state statute authorizing municipalities to "enact ordi-
nances providing for a system of parking meters designed to pro-
mote regulation and requiring a reasonable deposit," G. S. N. C.
Sec. 160-200, Subs. 31, the defendant town entered into a written
contract with plaintiff corporation for the purchase of parking me-
ters. Payment was to be made solely from a fund made up of one-
half the receipts of the meters, the town agreeing to enact and en-
force ordinances appropriate to their use. The meters had been in-
stalled and operated successfully for several months when a newly
elected town administration repealed the ordinances and repudiated
the contract. The seller obtained a decree for specific performance
from which the defendant appealed, contending that the contract
bargained away the governmental powers of the town. The court of
appeals, affirming, held, that the town was "engaged in the exercise
of powers incidental to its proprietary or private character, not
those governmental or legislative powers vested in it as an agency
of the state." The statute authorized municipalities to "engage in
the business of providing parking space for automobiles" and the
contract and ordinances were a reasonable exercise of the power
conferred. Town of Graham v. Karpark Corporation, 194 F. 2d 616
(4th Cir. 1952).
From the time that parking meters were introduced in 1935 as
a regulatory device to aid in the control of on-street parking, ordi-
nances providing for their use have been upheld, against varied
objections from many sources, as a valid and constitutional exer-
cise of the municipal police power. City of Columbus v. Ward, 65
Ohio App. 522, 31 N.E. 2d 142 (1940); Kimmell v. City of Spokane,
7 Wash. 2d 372, 109 P. 2d 1069 (1941); City of Bloomington v. Wir-
rick, 381 fI. 347, 45 N.E. 2d 852 (1942); 7 McQunmN, MumcnAL
ConpoRTAioNs § 24.650 (3d ed. 1949); See Notes, 108 A.L.R. 1152
(1937), 130 A.L.R. 316 (1940).
In spite of general approval, however, several parking meter
ordinances have been held invalid and, although some cases may
be distinguished on their facts, Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson
Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937), (later questioned in
City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So. 2d 673 (1948) );
City of Galveston v. Galveston County, 159 S.W. 2d 976 (1942), or
have involved procedural defects, Deaderick v. Parker, 211 Ark.
394, 200 S.W. 2d 787 (1947), a serious objection has centered
around the fee charged. While exaction of a reasonable fee to meet
the costs of operation and supervision is permissible, Bowers v. City
of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W. 2d 889 (1943); Cassidy v. City
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of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A. 2d 142 (1943); Foster's, Inc. v.
Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P. 2d 721 (1941), the courts repeated-
ly point out that the police power may not be used to disguise a
tax or revenue measure. In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass.
559, 8 N.E. 2d 179 (1937); Bowers v. City of Muskegon, supra. This
ground alone has been sufficient for invalidation of an ordinance,
Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940), and
the revenue scheme was a factor in the unfavorable North Dakota
decision of City of Fargo v. Sathre, 76 N.D. 341, 36 N.W. 2d 39
(1949).
Even the courts upholding the use of parking meters, while
indicating an obvious desire to allow the municipality as much lee-
way as possible, have encountered considerable difficulty in recon-
ciling the production of revenue by means of a regulatory measure,
and their opinions contain many statements to the effect that "the
court will not go behind the declared purpose of the act," Kimmell
v. City of Spokane, supra; "the fee is prima facie accepted as the
cost of service," Phoenix v. Moore, 57 Ariz. 350, 113 P. 2d 297
(1941); and "the court will not scrutinize the amount of the license
tax too severely," City of Decatur v. Robinson, supra. City of
Bloomington v. Wirrick, supra, and Bowers v. City of Muskegon,
supra, in particular, illustrate this problem. Note, also, the differ-
ence of opinion in City of Newark v. Municipal Governing Board
of New Jersey, 133 N.J.L. 513, 45 A. 2d 139 (1945), (revenue is
"general" revenue), and Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A.
2d 836 (1947), (revenue is a special revenue for highway use).
Ohio municipalities, by virtue of their home rule status, have
escaped many of the problems encountered in other jurisdictions.
The validity of parking meter ordinances has been challenged on
several occasions but in no instance successfully. The revenue
question has not been raised; rather, the issues have been confined
largely to procedural difficulties and alleged constitutional viola-
tions. Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393, 57 N.E. 2d
164 (1943); City of Columbus v. Ward, supra; Chevie v. City of
Cleveland, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 1 (1939). See also Attorney General's
opinion, '36 A.G. 927, and Turnbull v. City of Xenia, 89 Ohio App.
389, 69 N.E. 2d 378 (1946), (city permitted to operate meters on
county premises).
The judicial difficulties experienced in defending parking me-
ters on the theory that they are a regulatory device stem from their
potent revenue raising capacity. Many cities and towns, faced with
the need to bolster inadequate incomes from other sources, have
adopted parking meter systems as a solution to their fiscal troubles.
For this reason, a shift from the police power theory to a "busi-
ness" theory would frankly establish parking meters as a means
19531
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of collecting revenue from an out and out rental of streets for the
temporary storage of vehicles. 1 MuNicnw. LAw SERVICE LETTER,
Jan. 1951; 2 MuNmcIPAL LAW SERVICE LETER, Feb. 1952, May 1952.
The principal case represents the first judicial recognition of
a theory that municipalities may make a business of renting space
on their streets for the parking of automobiles. The court placed
the operation of parking facilities, under the enabling statute, in a
category with such typical municipal service activities as gas and
water supply, street lighting, and sewage disposal thus making the
challenged contract and ordinances a clear exercise of proprietary
power. In the face of the express statutory authorization of a rea-
sonable fee there was no argument or discussion of the measure as
an invalid producer of revenue and it was pointed out that an off-
street facility could as easily have been provided with very little
or no opposition.
A serious objection to a complete shift to a business theory of
metered parking is the limitation on governmental entry into the
domain of private, competitive enterprise. The view is stoutly de-
fended in the state courts that for a municipality to carry on a
competitive business it "must involve a public function or be con-
cerned with some element of public utility," City of Cleveland v.
Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936), and this requirement
constitutes a major hurdle to be cleared by the municipal venture,
especially as the dissimilarities between parking facilities and the
other services cited in the principal case are noted. Bowman v.
Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 233 S.W. 2d 26 (1950); People v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry. Co., 397 IM. 319, 74 N.E. 2d 510 (1947); Nash v. Town
of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E. 2d 209 (1947); Note, 41 Rarv. L.
Rev. 775.
A possible solution is indicated, though, in State v. Rhodes,
156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E. 2d 225 (1951), and similar cases, all con-
cerning off-street facilities, Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chicago
Park Dist., 412 IM. 350, 106 N.E. 2d 359 (1952); Poole v. City of
Kankakee, 401 IM. 521, 94 N.E. 2d 416 (1950); See Note, 8 A.L.R.
2d 374. In State v. Rhodes, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio up-
held a plan for an off-street parking garage when the apparent
failure of private parking concerns to meet the urgent demand for
service was demonstrated. Relying heavily on references in the
ordinance to the extreme congestion of the city's streets - with
the consequent public inconvenience plus the difficulty in moving
emergency vehicles -the court distinguished City of Cleveland
v. Ruple, supra, indicating that city's lack of any claim of necessity
or public purpose. Thus, in a situation made difficult or intolerable
due to the inability of private enterprise to cope with the demands
made upon it, a municipality may justify its entry into the field
by accenting the necessity for public intervention.
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This idea is implicit in the principal decision, 194 F. 2d at p.
619, and there should be no great difficulty in its application to on-
street plans. A useful stepping stone might well be the variation
approved in Wayne Village President v. Wayne Village Clerk, 323
Mich. 592, 36 N.W. 2d 157, 8 A.L.R. 357 (1949), where on- and off-
street facilities were combined into a single metered parking sys-
tem; also potentially valuable is a subsequent decision in State v.
Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E. 2d 206 (1952), in which on-
street parking revenues are favorably mentioned in connection with
the "overall public municipal purpose of furnishing necessary park-
ing facilities."
Perhaps the solution to the whole dilemma lies in the combina-
tion of the new theory with the old. A combined revenue-regula-
tion theory would recognize the still valuable function of parking
meters as an aid to parking and traffic control and, at the same
time, justify the added flow of revenue to municipal coffers.
James E. Chapman
PROPERTY-IDEAS
Plaintiff presented his scheme for a radio program to an officer
of the defendant bank and indicated that he expected compensation
if the proposed scheme were adopted. Defendant wrongfully ap-
propriated the scheme without making compensation therefor.
Plaintiff brought this action. Held: There is a property right in a
novel idea that is more than a mere abstraction if the idea is re-
duced to concrete detailed form. The right exists even though the
idea is neither patentable nor subject to copyright. Belt v. Hamilton
Nat. Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D.C. 1952).
Historically the courts have protected tangible property, but
they were reluctant to disregard the old legal maxim "that nothing
could be an object of property which has not a corporeal substance."
Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr 2303 (1769); 13 Ill. L. Rev. 709 (1919).
Thus, at common law there was no property right in ideas or plans.
Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N.E.
506 (1898); Hughes v. West Publishing Co., 225 Ill. App. 38 (1922).
But due to the progress and commercial success of the radio and
other media of advertisement, it became imperative that some pro-
tection be given ideas and schemes.
The courts had many obstacles to overcome before the final
barrier denying a cause of action was removed. They found great
difficulty in determining how this right could be protected safely
and justly without inviting an avalanche of unsupportable claims.
In order to cope more adequately with the problem the courts at-
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tempted to find some standard that they could follow. It was only
natural that they turned to the common law copyright for the
answer.
The established copyright rule was that every new and in-
nocent product of mental labor, unpublished, and embodied in
some writing or material form, is the exclusive property of its
author and entitled to the same protection which the law gives to
the possession and enjoyment of other kinds of property. Palmer v.
DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532; Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 Atl.
177 (1888). The author of an unpublished poem, encyclopedic
article, drama, opera, painting, architectural plan, ordinary letter,
lecture and sermon was entitled to the exclusive right to the first
publication. 18 C.J.S. 141. Omitting the question of originality, the
only basic difference between ideas and the matters covered by
the copyright law was that the latter were in some definite, tan-
gible, ascertainable form and the ideas were not.
The underlying theory seemed to be that a copyright was an
intangible, incorporeal right, in the nature of a privilege or fran-
chise, and wholly disconnected from and independent of any ma-
terial substance, such as a manuscript. King Features Syndicate v.
Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Coca-Cola v. State of Texas,
225 S. W. 791 (1920). Although the courts gave this theory lip
service, they were still reluctant to include protection for ideas, the
main reason being the unreliability of the proof available to sub-
stantiate the claims.
At first the courts stated categorically that the originator of
an idea or scheme had no legally recognized property right which
was entitled to protection against one who appropriated it. DRONE
ON COPYRIGHT, pp. 98, 385 (1879); Bristol v. Equitable Life As-
surance Society, supra; Hughes v. West Publishing Co., supra. Con-
ceivably, because of difficulties with its rationalization, some juris-
dictions partially diluted the doctrine by adding the phrase, "es-
pecially where the originator is without the means or devices for
carrying out the ideas or scheme." Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq.
575, 64 Atl. 436 (1906); Stein v. Morriss, 122 Va. 390, 91 S.E. 177
(1917).
A common law right in ideas, schemes, or plans is now es-
tablished and accepted in some jurisdictions. Liggett and Myers
Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Myers, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935);
Ryan and Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n., 185 Wash. 600,
55 P. 2d 1053, 104 A.L.R. 1353 (1936); Stanley v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P. 2d 73, 23 A.L.R. 2d 216 (1950).
In those jurisdictions that accept the doctrine of the principal case,
specific safeguards are enumerated. Recovery may be had only
when the idea is novel and has been reduced to concrete form prior
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to its disclosure to and appropriation by the defendant under cir-
cumstances indicating that compensation is expected. Liggett and
Myers Tobacco Co. v. Myers, supra; Stanley v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, supra; American Mint Corp. v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 263
App. Div. 89, N.Y.S. 2d 708 (1941). However, there are no gen-
erally accepted meanings as to what is novel and concrete. One
court held that a novel idea consisted of unique elements which
combine to produce a finished product having a being or distinctive
existence of its own. Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F.
Supp. (S.D. Cal. 1950). One could speculate from this that novelty
is synonymous to originality, originality being the test used to de-
termine rights under the common law copyright. Dorsey v. Old
Society Life Ins. Co., 98 F. 2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938).
When the plaintiff voluntarily divulges his ideas or sugges-
tions, whatever interest he may have had in them becomes common
property and as such is available to everyone. Moore v. Ford Motor
Co., 28 F. 2d 529 (S.D. N. Y. 1928); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 96
Am. Dec. 684 (1867). A general publication at common law amount-
ed to an abandonment of the copyright. Wagner v. Conried, 125
Fed. Rep. 798 (1903); Jewelers Merchantile Agency v. Jewelers
Publication Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898). But there are
no clear broad conceptual principles that can be deduced from the
cases to answer the question of what constitutes a publication of an
intellectual production which results in an abandonment of the
common law rights.
The underlying theory of the copyright law, and the patent
statute, makes the public benefit the primary consideration and
the owner's benefit secondary. United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). Therefore Brandeis' dissent in
the International News Service v. The Associated Press case, 248
U.S. 246 (1919), deserves careful consideration, especially in those
jurisdictions that are confronted for the first time with the same
problem as in the principal case. Brandeis' discussion of the per-
plexities and ramifications is very relevant to the present problem.
He raised two conflicting issues: (1) in order to promote progress
a maximum exchange of ideas is necessary and (2) in order to
promote individual initiative some protection for the product is
necessary. Brandeis concluded that although the propriety of some
remedy appears to be clear, the courts should decline to establish
a new rule of law which involves the extension of property rights.
He considered the legislature better equipped to prescribe the
limits of property rights in news. The broadening of the property
concept to include ideas raises similar questions.
With the increasing complexity of society, the public interest
tends to become omnipresent and the problems presented by new
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demands for justice cease to be simple. The creation or recognition
by courts of a new private right may work serious injury to the
general public, unless the boundaries of the right are definitely
established and wisely guarded. In order to reconcile the new
private right with the public interest, it may be necessary to pre-
scribe limitations and rules for its enjoyment; and also to provide
administrative machinery for enforcing the rule. It is a legislative
function to determine policy and to make new laws, and for this
job the legislature is much better equipped than are the courts.
The underlying, initial issue in the principal case is not whether
the plaintiff has a property right, but is who shall determine what
his rights are. Whether the courts will continue in these matters
to encroach upon the legislature's prerogatives is a question which
only time can answer.
Stanley R. Jurus Jr.
